We consider the complex interactions between rape culture and epistemology. A central case study is the consideration of a deferential attitude about the epistemology of sexual assault testimony. According to the deferential attitude, individuals and institutions should decline to act on allegations of sexual assault unless and until they are proven in a formal setting, i.e., a criminal court. We attack this deference from several angles, including the pervasiveness of rape culture in the criminal justice system, the epistemology of testimony (...) and norms connecting knowledge and action, the harms of tacit idealizations away from important contextual factors, and a contextualist semantics for 'knows' ascriptions. (shrink)

Counterspeech is communication that tries to counteract potential harm brought about by other speech. Theoretical interest in counterspeech partly derives from a libertarian ideal – as captured in the claim that the solution to bad speech is more speech – and partly from a recognition that well-meaning attempts to counteract harm through speech can easily misfire or backfire. Here we survey recent work on the question of what makes counterspeech effective at remedying or preventing harm, in those cases where it (...) is effective, as well as work investigating when and why there is a duty to engage in counterspeech. We suggest that the most fruitful area for philosophical inquiry on this topic, currently, relates to the questions about efficacy. Specifically, we argue that there is a need for better frameworks for conceptualizing the efficacy of counterspeech. Philosophers have collaborative work to do, alongside social scientists, in developing these frameworks. (shrink)

In this paper, the authors present a presuppositional account for a class of evaluative terms that encode both a descriptive and an evaluative component: slurs and thick terms. The authors discuss several issues related to the hybrid nature of these terms, such as their projective behavior, the ways in which one may reject their evaluative content, and the ways in which evaluative content is entailed or implicated (as the case may be) by the use of such terms.

The Introduction to "Non-Derogatory Uses of Slurs", special issue of Grazer Philosophische Studien.

Abstract In the last fifteen years philosophers and linguists have turned their attention to slurs: derogatory expressions that target certain groups on the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, nationality and so on. This interest is due to the fact that, on the one hand, slurs possess puzzling linguistic properties; on the other hand, the questions they pose are related to other crucial issues, such as the descriptivism/expressivism divide, the semantics/pragmatics divide and, generally speaking, the theory of meaning. Despite these (...) recent investigations about pejoratives, there is no widely accepted explanation of slurs:in my paper I consider the intuitions we have about slurs and I assess the difficulties that the main theories encounter in explaining how these terms work in order to identify the phenomena that a satisfactory account of slurs needs to explain. Then, I focus on the pragmatic theories that deal with the notions of conventional implicature and pragmatic presupposition: I assess the objections that have been raised and I propose two ways of defending the presuppositional account, taking into consideration the notion of cancellability. I will claim that the reason why most pragmatic strategies seem to fail to account for slurs is that they assume a rigid divide between conventional implicatures and presuppositions that should not be taken for granted. Reconsidering the relationship between these two notions gives a hint about how a pragmatic account of slurs should look like. Finally, I assess the problem of which presupposition slurs in fact trigger. (shrink)

What is the relation between language, communication, and values? In Slurs and Thick Terms, Bianca Cepollaro explores the ways in which certain pieces of evaluative language, such as slurs and so-called thick terms, not only reflect speakers’ moral perspectives, but also contribute to promote the speaker’s evaluative stance.

According to the closure-based radical skeptical argument, it is impossible for us to have knowledge of the majority of everyday propositions because we can’t have knowledge of the denials of the skeptical hypotheses they entail (Pritchard 96). In Chapter 6 of his book Epistemology, Duncan Pritchard describes a response to this argument which uses the sensitivity principle to deny the closure principle, thereby defeating the radical skeptic’s argument. Despite Pritchard’s concerns with this solution, denying the closure principle using the sensitivity (...) principle is a plausible method of defeating the skeptic. I respond to each of his three objections in turn. First, I argue that the reason the closure principle seems so intuitively plausible (despite being false) is that we tend to consider obvious entailments, rather than skeptical hypotheses, when considering the closure principle. Unlike the skeptical hypotheses, we can know the denial of the obvious entailments because those beliefs are sensitive. Second, I will explain why not allowing for inductive knowledge is no reason to reject the sensitivity principle, as true belief gained by induction can be considered rational belief, rather than knowledge. Finally, I will argue that the sensitivity principle can, indeed, provide the necessary counterexamples to the closure principle— something Pritchard denies because he thinks the sensitivity principle demands an evaluation process that cannot be applied when considering skeptical scenarios. However, with a proper understanding of what the sensitivity principle requires, we can use it to deny the closure principle. This paper endeavours to demonstrate that Pritchard’s concerns are not sufficient reason to reject the sensitivity principle as a solution to closure-based radical skepticism. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A widespread thesis in contemporary philosophy of language is that certain speech constitutes, rather than merely causes, harm. McGowan develops a prescriptive account of harm constitution, according to which harm-constituting speech enacts norms that prescribe harm. Ordinary verbal bigotry, she claims, is harmful in this sense. We submit that the norms enacted by ordinary racist (or otherwise bigoted) utterances are not prescriptive. In our view, ordinary verbal bigotry enacts ‘non-neutrally’ permissive norms rendering harmful behaviours locally permitted—and indeed preferred over (...) non-harmful options. We conclude by arguing that, although ordinary verbal bigotry enacts non-prescriptive norms, it can still constitute harm. (shrink)

Social responsibility is typically examined at the firm level, yet there are instances in which consumers’ social responsibility perceptions of the firm’s product brands differ from social responsibility perceptions with regard to the firm [i.e., corporate social responsibility ]. This article conceptualizes brand social responsibility and delineates it from CSR. Following the development of a BSR scale, this research demonstrates variations in consumers’ social responsibility perceptions across product brands even if they are owned by the same corporation and compete in (...) the same product category. BSR is distinct from CSR, and better predicts consumers’ responses to product brands compared to corporate level measures. Consistent with the conceptual distinction, this research demonstrates the unique contribution of BSR and CSR in predicting product brand and corporate outcomes, respectively. From a theoretical viewpoint, this research is one of the few to examine differences between product brand and CSR. From a managerial viewpoint, the consideration of social responsibility at the product brand level facilitates the assessment of social responsibility perceptions across brands in brand portfolios managed under a mixed-branding or house-of-brands strategy. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a novel interpretation of Kant’s proof of the existence of the outer world in the Refutation of Idealism. According to this interpretation, Kant’s proof does not provide a regressive explanation of our capacity to determine the temporal order of our experiences. Rather, it expresses a counterfactual reflection on what it takes for something to be actual in contrast to being merely imagined. On the ground of this reflection, Kant argues against the Cartesian sceptic that, even (...) if all our representations of empirical objects other than ourselves failed to be veridical, we would still know a priori that in every situation in which we, as thinking things, actually exist, something outside us in space must necessarily exist. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide arguments based on linguistic evidence that discard a truth-conditional analysis of slurs and pave the way for more promising approaches. We consider Hom and May’s version of TCA, according to which the derogatory content of slurs is part of their truth-conditional meaning such that, when slurs are embedded under semantic operators such as negation, there is no derogatory content that projects out of the embedding. In order to support this view, Hom and (...) May make two moves: they point to cases where it looks like projection does not occur and they try to explain away cases where projection seems to occur by appealing to a pragmatic phenomenon that they call ‘offense’. Pace Hom and May, we argue that the derogatory content of slurs does in fact project and, in advocating for our claim, we show that those cases where it looks like projection does not occur are in fact metalinguistic uses in which slurs are not really used, by relying on three linguistic tests ; and we refute Hom and May’s attempt to explain why speakers would entertain the supposedly wrong intuition that the derogatory content of slurs projects out of semantic embedding, by focusing on the case of slurs for fictional entities. We conclude that Hom and May’s strategies to support TCA ultimately fail. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 10, October 2020, Page 75-77.

Com base na visão crítica do filósofo sul-coreano, Byung-Chul Han, de que a ordem digital está descoisificando o mundo ao informatizá-lo, o artigo propõe uma reflexão sobre os riscos da migração humana para a infosfera ou para o mundo-das-não-coisas. Em tal universo, somente as informações digitais prevalecem, circulando ininterruptamente, surpreendendo, excitando, e, com isso, inaugurando uma nova forma de controle social. Pelas vias desse tipo de comunicação de massa, o virtual se impõe aos fatos, relativizando a relação com verdade e (...) verificação e, consequentemente, com democracia, memória e história. A psicopolítica, sistema de poder hegemônico atual, é a quem interessa essa manobra do psiquismo humano pela contínua positividade estimuladora, que visa transformar cidadãos em meros phono sapiens jogadores de uma ‘realidade’ gamificada. Por isso, o momento exige debate a respeito dos limites permitidos às tecnologias e à inteligência artificial, pois se passam a servir de sinônimo à anulação do mundo-das-coisas é porque nos ameaçam com a perda do mundo como tal. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Kant’s doctrine of definitions, as it is developed in theTranscendental Doctrine of Method(TDM) and in the lectures on logic, lays down the semantic background of the problem of the objective reality of the categories and of the solution Kant provides for it in theTranscendental Analytic. The distinction between nominal and real definitions introduces a two-dimensional element in Kant’s theory of concepts, and this, I argue, provides a compelling explanation for the assumption Kant makes in (...) §13 that it is possible to possess a concept without knowing the conditions of its legitimate application. This view is supported by the parallels between Kant’s discussion of empirical, mathematical, and philosophical concepts in §13 and in theTDM. And, it allows clarifying the sense in which the arguments that prove the objective reality of the categories are, at the same time, counterfactual reflections that give us (incomplete) insight into their real definitions. (shrink)

In this article, Bianca Thoilliez draws on pragmatist notions of fallibilism and pluralism to develop proposals for possible educational interventions to address the problem of “post-truth” conditions. Post-truth, she contends, is not only a political danger for liberal democracies, but it also poses a serious threat of extinction for our educational practices. With the help of some of Bruno Latour's and Danna Haraway's categories, and with the narrative intervention of Gerald Durrell's My Family and Other Animals, Thoilliez attempts to (...) adapt both Charles Peirce's and William James's classic pragmatist ideas in order to experiment with new horizons of thought capable of overcoming the exhausted pedagogical divides of docility/indocility, conserve/discard, and optimism/pessimism that often seem woven into the definition of educational relationships, the establishment of curriculum content, and the orientation of pedagogical actions. As an alternative, she recommends building communitarian alliances of fallibilistic inquiry and promoting practices of pluralistic cultural provision as more useful educational ends-in-view that embody a down-to-earth pedagogy capable of reinstating trust, taking care of truths, looking for ways of keeping our lives together, and making education possible again. Thus, here Thoilliez proposes a pedagogy that neither fixes nor evades our troubles, but one that stays with them. (shrink)

At a time of pedagogical exhaustion, this article wants to imagine ways to redeem education, to spare education from its unaccomplished promises, reinvent and renew its vows, and make it somehow work towards possible futures. But how can this be done when there is no longer the old inherited faith in a direction of history with an end, no ‘telos’ nor faith that educational institutions will inevitably move societies forwards? Is there any ‘after’ if the arrow of history points in (...) no direction? What can we collectively expect from education if we have no assurance that schooling can lead to anything better than what we are now, or that caring for truth will make people freer? In place of the modernist idea of progress, the alternative narrative that is being offered to school systems and teachers is what I will describe as the ‘innovation paradigm’. Within this framework what we are, what we have, and what is in place are presented as declining, inadequate, and unsatisfactory. This narrative has become so powerful that from a ‘pedagogical popular culture’ perspective it has turned into the mainstream way of thinking about our educational institutions, practices, and hopes. Would it not, however, be more pedagogically productive to speak of ‘variation’ instead of ‘innovation’? Might this be the potential path for redeeming education after progress? [Editorial note: this paper forms part of the suite of papers entitled ‘Education After Progress’.]. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to discuss three representative works by Dalit writers—Bama’s Karukku, the first autobiography by a Dalit woman, Baby Kamble’s memoir, The Prisons We Broke,...

O presente artigo tem o escopo de analisar as influências deixadas por Hans Kelsen e sua Teoria Pura do Direito para a Hermenêutica Jurídica e as incertezas ainda presentes em sua clássica obra sobre o processo interpretativo. O positivismo kelseniano, reconhecido pela separação entre direito e moral, não se omitiu quanto à realidade da interpretação jurídica, e, sem desconsiderar suas bases teóricas, deixou diretrizes para a consolidação de uma teoria da interpretação. Kelsen desenvolveu o conceito de moldura normativa como um (...) limite para o intérprete autêntico da norma cuja subjetividade influenciaria o processo interpretativo, mas também viu possibilidades de interpretações fora desta moldura. O trabalho pretende entender estas possibilidades de interpretação, analisando Hans Kelsen e seus ensinamentos sobre interpretação jurídica. (shrink)

ABSTRACTFor Rorty, any attempt to articulate a theory of truth as such is of no interest. This implies that although it may be meaningful to differentiate the truths from the falsehoods, it is pointless to say what the property of goodness is in the things we believe are good to do. Rorty points out that our no longer understanding Philosophy – with the capital ‘P’–as the framing of normative notions would make room for a post-philosophical culture where the philosophers’ activity (...) would be closer to the practices of cultural critique with the self-imposed limitation of devoting themselves exclusively to advancing descriptions of how things relate to each other. This article aims to explore what would happen if this provocation were brought to the field of Pedagogy. Taking on this Rortyan theme, keeping hope on the potentially liberating and transformative power of education implies a hopeful attitude by which individuals involved in education processes express their love for the world as a commitment to a better future, as well as their belief in its possibilities. (shrink)

With agriculture the primary driver of biodiversity loss, farmers are increasingly expected to produce environmental outcomes and protect biodiversity. However, lack of attention to the way farmers perceive native vegetation has resulted in conservation targets not being met. The Yorke Peninsula (YP), South Australia, is an agricultural landscape where 50% farmers perceived that long-term planning was for ≤ 30 years, not enough time to promote ecosystem conservation; (5) a lack of natural resource management information for farmers—as a result, farmers relied (...) on their own experience to manage vegetation. Furthermore, most farmers depended on agronomists, who generally had no stake in biodiversity conservation. We recommend that (1) the Local Council restore social capital by liaising with farmers to promote roadside vegetation (2) long-term farmer-led conservation action be established and supported by Government and industry acting as facilitators rather than project managers; (3) a change in policy and training promote the involvement of agronomists in conservation and its management on private properties; (4) all levels of Government develop schemes to demonstrate the tangible benefits of native vegetation as habitat for wildlife; (5) on-farm conservation be celebrated as successful farming. (shrink)

L’auteur s’interroge sur la transmission du traumatisme chez les descendants des survivants de génocide. Il insiste sur le gel des affects, l’adhésivité dans la concrétude à des traces du passé. Des pseudo-identifications agies peuvent être comprises grâce au travail dans le contre-transfert.

In this paper, I consider the phenomenon of evaluation reversal for two classes of evaluative terms that have received a great deal of attention in philosophy of language and linguistics: slurs and thick terms. I consider three approaches to analyze evaluation reversal: (i) lexical deflationist account, (ii) ambiguity account and (iii) echoic account. My purpose is mostly negative: my aim is to underline the shortcomings of these three strategies, in order to possibly pave the way for more suitable accounts.

The case states that a male same-sex couple entered into a surrogacy arrangement with an unrelated surrogate using donor sperm and the surrogate’s eggs. M is the legal mother pursuant to s33 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008. Though the facts tell us that there was no legally binding arrangement, this is in fact the position of the law: under s1A Surrogacy Arrangements Act, no surrogacy arrangements can ever be binding on the parties. It is not clear whether (...) the donor sperm is from one of the same-sex couple or not. If it was donor sperm and not from either intended father, this is not an arrangement that would be recognised in law, as one of the men must be genetically related to the child in order for them to obtain legal parenthood via a parental order, under s54 HFEA 2008. They could apply to adopt the child, although they may fall foul of adoption legislation1 if any money has moved between them and M and they do not fall within an exemption.2 In any event, an adoption cannot be achieved in time for them to obtain legal parenthood in a crisis situation. In the absence of a biological connection and the resulting legal parenthood, in order to obtain parental responsibility for the child to allow them to make decisions about Baby T’s care, the men would need to apply for leave to apply for a child arrangements order pursuant to s10 Children Act 1989. However, in the …. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe article investigates which epistemological considerations justify how religious life fits into the school life, and examines the debate on the participation of religiosity in the education system. I do this, first, by addressing the pedagogical implications of the distinction between public and private as maintained by Richard Rorty and, second, by reconsidering the pluralist metaphysics held by William James as an alternative path to understanding and re-addressing the question of religious life in school life. The article analyzes how the (...) strict separation of projects of individual self-creation and the public sphere, as defended by Rorty, poses problems in implementing pluralism in democratic societies and their educational institutions. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 56, Issue 3-4, pp 222 - 240 In medieval theories of consequence, we encounter several criteria of validity. One of these is known as the containment criterion: a consequence is valid when the consequent is contained or understood in the antecedent. The containment criterion was formulated most frequently in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but it can be found in earlier writings as well. In _The Tradition of the Topics in the Middle Ages_, N.J. Green-Pedersen claimed that (...) this criterion originated with Boethius. In this article, the author shows that a notion of containment is indeed present in Boethius, but is not used to define or describe the relation between antecedent and consequent, i.e., the relation of consequence, as Green-Pedersen asserted. The author then offers two interpretations of the notion of containment that are present in Boethius – a metaphysical and a semantic interpretation – and shows how these relate to the containment criterion. (shrink)

In this article, we present paradoxical findings from a formative evaluation research project that explores how preadolescent girls understand and feel about their bodies after participating in “Girls on the Run of Los Angeles County”, a girl-serving positive youth development program. Findings from pre/post test data show that girls’ body image improved after participation in GOTR LA, yet many girls also reported the dominant thin ideal and the importance of not being fat as key characteristics of strong and healthy bodies. (...) Ethnographic data suggest that institutional, organizational, and interactional factors contribute to these findings. Institutionalized fat-negative discourses translate into subtle messages regarding health and the body through organizational communications and through interactions between volunteer coaches and participants in ways that solidify dominant conceptions of the feminine body despite explicit programmatic intentions to challenge them. Theoretically, we draw from feminist cultural studies’ work on the gendered body to expand the dominant focus on institutionalized obsessions with thinness through the critical analysis of fat and anti-fat bias. On an applied level, our discussion of unintended program outcomes reveals the complexities in organizational interventions designed to influence girls’ body image. (shrink)

De se attitudes seem to play a special role in action and cognition. This raises a challenge to the traditional way in which mental attitudes have been understood. In this chapter, we review the case for thinking that de se attitudes require special theoretical treatment and discuss various ways in which the traditional theory can be modified to accommodate de se attitudes.

The past 20 years witnessed a growing interest in philosophy of language and linguistics for expressives and, in particular, for slurs – terms that target people and groups on accounts of their belonging to a certain category (typically having to do with ethnic origins, gender, sexual orientation, religion, and so on). This lively debate often relies on empirical claims – “these terms are not derogatory in this context”, “their use affects the audience’s beliefs and attitudes in this and that way”, (...) “reporting a slur backfires”, and so on and so forth. Some scholars have tried to back up their claims with existing empirical data from psychology and psycholinguistics, while a few others went and investigated their questions on experimental grounds. In this chapter, I offer an overview of this experimental literature on slurs and derogatory labels, and I illustrate an array of ways in which the philosophical issues that slurs raise to the proverbial armchair benefit from empirical studies in psychology, psycholinguistics, and experimental philosophy. (shrink)

O artigo trata do modo como as pesquisas genealógicas de Nietzsche e de Foucault, opondo-se aos pressupostos metafísicos, engendram relações ético-políticas que escapam ao apelo de qualquer normatividade ideal ao realizar a crítica do presente. Partindo da recusa no pensamento nietzscheano da oposição de valores que forja origens sublimes desligadas da imanência das disputas mundanas, exploramos como a reconstrução das invenções históricas de valores induz à demanda por uma construção afirmativa de si mesmo. Em um segundo momento, o artigo se (...) ocupa das ressonâncias e desdobramentos da genealogia de Nietzsche no pensamento foucaultiano, analisando, principalmente, como a tarefa do diagnóstico do presente transforma a filosofia e sua forma de atuação. Por fim, concluímos com uma possibilidade de afirmação de um modo de vida outro na reflexão de Foucault sobre o movimento gay. (shrink)

The last decade saw a growing interest for hate speech and the ways in which language reflects and perpetuates discrimination, with two main focuses of interest: a linguistic-oriented question about how slurs encode evaluation on the one hand, and a philosophical and psychological question about the effects elicited by slurs. In this paper, I show how the two questions are deeply related by illustrating how a certain linguistic analysis of derogatory epithets – the presuppositional one – can shed light on (...) non-linguistic issues, namely what effects the use of slurs produce, especially concerning discrimination. I present a presuppositional account of slurs (Section 2) and I show how such an analysis provides convincing explanations of other non-linguistic phenomena: in particular, I consider the ways in which slurs reflect and spread discrimination by illustrating how they work in conversation (Section 3). In Section 4, I argue that some features of slurs presented in Sections 2 and 3, namely the fact that they always target a category and the fact that the derogatory content that they convey is presented as not open to discussion, make slurs particularly dangerous tools. I conclude by briefly assessing the question as to how one should respond when exposed to the use of slurs. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the Reclamation Worry (RW), raised by Anderson and Lepore 2013 and addressed by Ritchie (2017) concerning the appropriation of slurs. I argue that Ritchie’s way to solve the RW is not adequate and I show why such an apparent worry is not actually problematic and should not lead us to postulate a rich complex semantics for reclaimed slurs. To this end, after illustrating the phenomenon of appropriation of slurs, I introduce the Reclamation Worry (section 2). (...) In section 3, I argue that Richie’s complex proposal is not needed to explain the phenomenon. To show that, I compare the case of reclaimed and non-reclaimed slurs to the case of polysemic personal pronouns featuring, among others, in many Romance languages. In section 4 I introduce the notion of ‘authoritativeness’ that I take to be crucial to account for reclamation. In section 5, I focus on particular cases (the “outsider” cases) that support my claims and speak against the parsimony of the indexical account. Finally, I conclude with a methodological remark about the ways in which the debate on appropriation has developed in the literature (section 6). (shrink)

We present two experimental studies on the Italian expressive ‘stronzo’. The first study tests whether, and to which extent, the acceptability of using an expressive is sensitive to the information available in the context. The study looks both at referential uses of expressives and predicative uses of expressives. The results show that expressives are sensitive to contextual information to a much higher degree than the non-expressive control items in their referential use, but also, albeit to a lesser degree, in their (...) predicative use. The second study tests whether the lower acceptability of expressives in their predicative use may be simply due to saying something negative about someone. A comparison between expressives, such as ‘jerk’, and non-expressive negative terms, such as ‘nasty’ or ‘unbearable’, suggests that it is the expressive nature of these terms, rather than the mere negative valence, that affects acceptability. Our studies present a major challenge to the existing accounts of expressives, and raise several theoretical issues that still call for an answer. (shrink)

This book purports to devise a pattern of the self that accounts for the role that change and identity play in self-shaping. It focuses on the process through which we discover, know and shape ourselves and wonder whether there is a core of our individuality and how we should account for it. The core is described along with its range of possible variations and its constraints. This volume provides arguments on how individual essence – far from being something monolithic – (...) is inherently dynamic. The text delves into the link between change and identity in self-shaping, arguably the fundamental issue of personal individuality. Different theories and standpoints are addressed and scrutinized. Descriptive phenomenology will enter along with Max Scheler’s stance on axiology, as well as the keystones that account for self-shaping. This book appeals to students and researchers working on the implications of phenomenology for self identification and personal individuality. (shrink)

This chapter attempts to differentiate between types of monumental representations of Jerusalem, to locate them historically and to explore the reasons for their extraordinary density by deciphering the essentials of their function as mnemonic devices in the framework of medieval devotionalism. Conditioned by historical events such as the Crusades, Franciscan canonization of the Stations of the Cross and the Counter-Reformation, representation of Jerusalem gradually expanded from copies of Christ's tomb in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre to commemorate the Stations (...) of the Cross and other holy places in Jerusalem and the Holy Land. The holy landscapes are multimedia representations: they combine topography and architecture with life-size figural groups and wall painting to identify the holy places. Groups of such representations could form separate sites at a certain distance from settlements, or encompass a city with a network of reproduced loca sancta. (shrink)